JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Although it has been conjectured that this was also true during most of the nineteenth century, the evidence to support the conjecture is weak. We present a summary of a large sample of data for individual cities in 1850, 1860, and 1870, and link it to census data for 1880, 1890, and 1902. We study effects of city size and geographical location, and trends over time in city fiscal activity. Our provisional conclusion is that local government became the largest of the three components in the federal system only toward the end of the nineteenth century. 
most important of the three levels of government." That was certainly the case in regard to revenues and expenditures in 1902 and 1913, but Davis and Legler acknowledge that their estimates for earlier years were subject to reasonable doubt.
In this article, we study nineteenth-century trends in local public finance, with emphasis on the finances of cities. The main body of evidence underlying our study is a large sample of primary source data on the finances of cities in 1850, 1860, and 1870. We link these data to the more complete census data for the years 1880, 1890, and 1902. The entire data set allows us to study trends in per capita U.S. city finances between 1850 and 1902, as well as differences in each of the years among cities of different sizes and cities in different geographical regions of the United States.
The main goal of the article is to explore the Davis-Legler conjecture. There are problems with inferring (as Davis and Legler did) from the relative importance of local finance in the overall local-state-federal system as of 1902, that local finance was the largest of the three levels during the preceding century. Early in the nineteenth century, when Americans were largely a rural people, local finance for the most part was county finance.3 As the century unfolded, urbanization altered the character of local finance. At mid-century only 15 percent of Americans lived in urban as opposed to rural places (with "urban" defined as a place with 2,500 or more people). By 1900, 40 percent of Americans lived in urban places. The share of the population living in larger cities (defined here as places with 25,000 or more) rose even more rapidly, from 9 percent in 1850 to 26 percent in 1900.4 There was also, of course, a redistribution of population among regions of the nation.
Local public finance was largely urban public finance at the turn of the twentieth century. At that time it surpassed both federal and state finance, and even the combined total of federal and state finance. But the urban sector as a whole, and still more so the city component, was much less important in a relative population sense a half-century earlier. We need to know more about relative federal, state, and local spending levels at dates before 1902 to assess the Davis-Legler conjecture. This article represents a first step in that direction. In addition, we used city financial reports contained in local newspapers, a source that expanded our data base, especially in the earlier years, and broadened the geographic coverage, especially of southern cities.
DATA SOURCES AND METHODS

We
Locating data was the first step in constructing a standardized data base. The data base was constructed to facilitate analysis of the relative role of municipal government in the economy. Accordingly, tax revenues were limited to those collected for city purposes, beginning and end of year balances were netted out, and intergovernmental revenues of a temporary nature were excluded.
Because complete data for each city on every category of revenue and expenditure were not available for the years prior to 1880, the average per capita figures for separate categories in these years are based on the data that were available. They represent, so to speak, a sample of our sample. Thus, in the case of cities for which the only available data were described as total revenues with no breakdown by category of revenue, we treated these data strictly as such, making no attempt to allocate among taxes, debt revenues, and other sources. In calculating average per capita revenues for a given year, the total revenue category would be affected by inclusion of the total revenues of these cities, but the average figures for other component categories (tax revenues, debt revenues, and so on) would be unaffected, that is, would be based only on the subsample of cities for which we actually have data on these categories. As a consequence the individual categories of average revenues and expenditures will not always add up to the average total revenues and expenditures in our tables. The data for 1850, 1860, and 1870 are not a random sample. Rather, they are a large, non-random sample of all cities and the urban population. By including data from nearby years when census year data were not available, we cover approximately half or more of cities with populations of 30,000 or more, and an even larger fraction of the population of such cities.7
REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES
BY CITY SIZE Table 1 presents the data we have derived on real per capita city revenues and expenditures from 1850 to 1902 classified by size of city.8 We draw two main conclusions from these data. The first is that in general real per capita revenues and expenditures vary directly with city size-the larger the city, the higher the level of fiscal activity per person. This pattern is almost always evident in the fairly complete data we have for 1880 to 1902. It is less evident in the less complete data for 1850 to 1870, but it would become clearer were we to reduce the city size categories for these years from five to three or two. Since fiscal activity tended to increase with city size, the reported averages understate the growth of fiscal activity in individual larger cities. As cities gained population over time, they moved up in size class. In 1850, New York was the only city in class 1, but by 1902 several cities exceeded the 300,000 population level. San Francisco, for example, moved from a class III city in 1850 to become a class I city by the turn of the century. The inclusion over time of relatively smaller cities in the large-city class pulls down the averages for that class. Our second conclusion is that real fiscal activity per capita increased three to four times over the five decades. In rough terms, real fiscal activity per capita in cities increased at a 2 to 3 percent average annual rate over the five decades. Such a rate is well above the annual average question of the nineteenth-century elasticity of fiscal activity with respect to income remains to be investigated. We can, however, decompose the growth of total per capita fiscal activity into demographic and non-demographic factors. Only about 5 percent of the growth in tax revenues, for example, is due to an increase in the share of the total urban population living in larger cities. Fully 80 percent of the increase can be attributed to a rise in tax collections for cities of given sizes, while interaction between the two elements accounts for the remainder.'0 A broad increase in the size of the public sector of urban areas occurred in cities of all sizes, and the rate of growth of revenues and expenditures was not markedly higher in the largest cities than in the smallest. Table 2 To investigate further the effect of the fiscal activity of larger cities on This finding, although tentative and based only on tax revenues, negates the Davis-Legler conjecture about the importance of local government throughout the nineteenth century. Local government became the largest component only toward the end of the century. One of the major reasons for this development is that more and more Americans chose to live in cities where tax burdens (and public expenditures) per person were high. Why they made this choice is more a question of urban economics than simply of urban public finance. A succinct answer is that of Eugene Smolensky: "City growth and national economic growth proceeded together because cities constitute the most efficient way to organize economic activity in space."'14 To obtain the efficiencies of cities a variety of costs-some private, others collective-were incurred. The issue of whether (or better, to what extent) U.S. cities grew historically because of, or despite, the higher per capita tax burdens incurred to provide collectively consumed goods and services remains to be investigated as more historical data on urban public finance accumulate. On a related issue, however, we can be more positive. The research reported here suggests to us that the historical origin of government's rising relative share of U.S. economic life lies not, as many believe, in the increased federal fiscal activity of the twentieth century but rather in the increased local activity, especially of large city governments, in the latter decades of the nineteenth century. 
REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN CITY FINANCES
